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1. Introduction 
Capital volatility has been a key feature of the international financial system over 
recent years, yet our understanding of what determines capital flows remains limited at best. 
Following the surge of private capital towards and consequent economic booms in some Latin 
American and Asian in the early 1990s, both theoretical and empirical analysis began to 
distinguish between “pull” and “push” factors. Was capital pulled into recipient countries by 
their internal policies and performance, or was it pushed towards them as a consequence of 
external factors beyond their control, such as interest rates and economic activity in the rest of 
the world? Recent research has shown how pull and push factors may be complementary, 
with push factors determining the timing and magnitude of capital flows to emerging 
economies and pull factors determining their geographic distribution (Carlson and Hernandez, 
2002, Dasgupta and Ratha, 2000 and Montiel and Reinhart, 2000). 
Capital volatility and related currency crises and consequent economic busts have 
often been linked to short term bank lending and portfolio equity flows. Theoretical models 
have been developed to explain how bank flows and portfolio flows may be subject to swings 
in market sentiment which may be cumulative and self-endorsing (Rajan, 2002)
1. 
Capital flows to and from East Asia during the 1990s provide further evidence of 
capital volatility. During the boom period of the early-to-mid 1990s there were large capital 
inflows primarily in the form of bank lending. Superficially, the inflows were consistent with 
both pull and push explanations. Many of the regional economies had embarked on policies of 
financial liberalization, which saw domestic interest rates rise (Bird and Rajan, 2001). 
Moreover, rapid economic growth and credibly pegged exchange rates were attractive to 
foreign creditors. At the same time, slow economic growth in many industrial countries at the 
beginning of the 1990s, combined with relatively low rates of interest, pushed capital towards 
                                                           
1 In recognition of the urgent need to further study and understand the workings and dynamics of 
international capital markets and flows, the IMF recently established a new International Capital 
Markets Department.  
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emerging economies where economic prospects seemed brighter
2. However, the subsequent 
loss of confidence in these economies resulted in a massive turnaround in capital flows. Boom 
was followed by bust. What do the data tell us about this? 
Balance of payments data from the IMF reveal that the five Asian economies most 
afflicted by the regional crisis, viz. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Korea 
(henceforth termed “Asia-5 economies”) saw a sharp reversal in net private capital flows of 
over $100 billion between 1996 and 1998. This reversal was primarily due to the “other 
investment component” of net short term lending by foreign commercial banks, which 
averaged about $30 billion in inflows between 1995 and 1996, but turned into a net outflow of 
about $30 billion over the following two years as international banks became unwilling to roll 
over existing short term debts to the region (Table 1). 
  BIS data reveal that international bank lending to the Asia 5 economies which had 
remained buoyant at almost $50 billion in the first half of 1997, swung to -$40 billion over 
the following three quarters (BIS, 1999)
3. This sudden reversal in bank lending is often 
presented as providing strong evidence in support of a bank panic model (Chang and Velasco, 
1998, and Radelet and Sachs, 1998)
4. However, a less emphasized feature of this period was 
the decline in portfolio flows following the initial bank panic as investors also tried to scale 
down their exposures in the region (also see Carlson and Hernandez, 2002). Referring again 
to the IMF balance of payments data, portfolio inflows totaled $36 billion in 1995 and 1996, 
but they slowed to $9 billion in 1997; then there was a net outflow of $9 billion in 1998. 
                                                           
2 The trigger country, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia were among the ten largest emerging market 
recipients of net private capital flows during the period under consideration (Rajan and Siregar, 2001 
and Lopez-Mejia, 1999 and World Bank, 1997). 
 
3 Bank-related outflows have continued unabated (i.e. the “other net investment” component). The 
sustained bank outflows from the regional occurred despite a renewed willingness of lenders to 
maintain, if not slightly increase, exposures to the region because of repayments of external liabilities 
to commercial banks. These repayments were largely concentrated in Thailand and Indonesia (IIF, 
2001, 2002). It is important to note that a central difference between the outflows in 1997-98 and since 
then was that the former was largely unanticipated and thus highly disruptive. In the latter, the loan 
repayments had been anticipated and scheduled. 
 
4 Of course, these ex-post swings in bank flows are only necessary and not sufficient evidence in 
support of a bank panic model (Rajan, 2001). 
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These flows once again turned positive in 1999 and 2000. In contrast, FDI flows have 
remained remarkably stable throughout the period under consideration
5 (Table 1).  
Having briefly outlined the dynamics of capital flows in East Asia in the 1990s, the 
remainder of this paper concentrates on portfolio equity flows. Its purpose is essentially 
empirical and is to see whether evidence drawn from the Asian economies during the 1990s 
allows us to acquire a clearer understanding of what factors determine portfolio capital flows. 
The theoretical framework adopted is that of a simple informational-frictions capital crisis 
model which focuses on portfolio flows and which emphasizes the importance of sudden 
losses of confidence that spread quickly throughout international capital markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the theoretical 
foundations underpinning instability in short term capital flows, and shows how rumors and 
news, even if unsubstantiated by fundamentals, may create panic in terms of market 
sentiment. Section 3 goes on to provide some relatively simple but still useful tests based on 
empirical evidence drawn from the Asia 5 economies using variables suggested by the 
theoretical analysis. Section 4 concentrates on the dynamics of financial interdependencies 
between the regional Asian economies. Section 5 offers a summary and a few concluding 
remarks. 
 
2.  Capital Account Crises:  Theoretical Preliminaries 
2.1 Bank-based  Models 
It has become commonplace to interpret the new genre of flow-based currency crisis 
models as taking a “bank centered” view. While this is far too narrow a perspective and does 
not do adequate justice to the large milieu of new crisis models, it is not altogether surprising. 
After all, the high correlation between banking and currency crises (so-called “twin crises”) 
since the late 1980s and 1990s is well documented, with the causation most often running 
from banking to currency crises (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
 What is more, these twin 
                                                           
5 Indonesia was the only exception, FDI having collapsed due to ongoing socio-political uncertainties 
(ADB, 2001 and World Bank, 1999).    5
crises are far more pervasive in developing countries than developed ones (Glick and 
Hutchison, 1999). 
Much ink has been spilt over the question of whether the East Asian crisis was due to 
insolvency or illiquidity. Whatever the reasons for the crisis and devaluation, the extent of the 
post devaluation collapse is exacerbated by the nominal appreciation of external liabilities 
which are often foreign currency based and unhedged, slashing the net worth of individuals, 
corporations and the domestic financial systems at large (Aghion et al., 2000, Dornbusch, 
2000, Krugman, 1999, 2000 and Velasco, 2001). This so-called “balance sheet” effect leads 
to massive collateral damage and outright bankruptcies, which in turn aggravate domestic 
economic conditions and intensify capital outflows. 
 
2.2 A  Portfolio-based  Model   
As noted, it is a common misconception to assume that all flow-based third 
generation models are bank-based. A prominent example of one that is not is the portfolio 
equity-based model by Calvo and Mendoza (2000). We consider below a bare-bones version 
of the Calvo-Mendoza capital crisis model - a simple one period mean-variance model of 
optimal portfolio diversification/allocation.  
Assume the existence of homogenous atomistic investors. Assume J countries in 
which investors allocate a fixed pool of funds which we normalize to one unit. Assume 
returns in each are distributed i.i.d. with mean of ρ and variance of σ0
2
. Focusing on a single 
agent, assume the investor hears a “rumor” that country k’s new stochastic return is r, where 
(r - ρ) = ε ≠ 0. Let returns in country k = σ1. Let ∅ be the share of the portfolio invested in all 
countries other than country k. Denote the portfolio by X. Thus, the portfolio’s mean and 
variance are respectively: 
 
 E(X)  =  ρ + (1 - ∅)ε,               ( 1 )  
  Var (X) =  [(∅σ0)
2/(J - 1) + (1 - ∅)σ1
2] .       ( 2 )    6
Assume that the representative agent is a price taker. Under the assumption of normal 
distribution of returns, let the agent maximize the following quadratic objective function (U) 
w.r.t. ∅: 
 
Max EU(X) = [(1 - ∅)ε+ ρ] - ν/2[(∅σ0)
2/(J - 1) + (1 - ∅)
2σ1
2],  ν > 0.  (3)   
 
Solving for the proportion of funds devoted to country k obtains: 
  
(1 - ∅) = [ϒ + ε/ν]/[ϒ + σ1
2] ,        ( 4 )  
 
where: ϒ = σ0
2/(J - 1).  
In the absence of news on returns in country k (i.e. country k is identical to all other 
countries ex-ante), from eq. (4), the share of portfolio allocated to the country is 1/J, as would 
be expected a priori. Accordingly, in the absence of news, the portfolio allocated to country k 
tends to become negligible as J gets arbitrarily large (i.e. abundant alternatives for portfolio 
diversification). On the other hand, from eq. (4), with the impact of news, the change in 
portfolio composition to country k becomes extremely sensitive to the expected mean return 
differential (ε) and variance in country k as J  ∞. Specifically, 
 
∂(1 - ∅)/∂ε = [ν/[ϒ + σ1
2]
-1,        ( 5 )  
and,   ∂(1 - ∅)/∂ε  1/(νσ1
2)  as  J  ∞.       ( 5
l) 
  ∂(1 - ∅)/∂σ
2
1 = -[ϒ + ε/ν]/[ϒ + σ1
2]
2,       ( 6 )  
and,   ∂(1 - ∅)/∂σ
2
1   -ε/(νσ1
4)  as  J  ∞.                       (6
l) 
 
Those who take a benign view of speculation argue that it would be in agents’ best 
interests to gather the necessary information upon which to make their investment decisions. 
To the extent that their actions are based on best available information, speculation cannot be   7
considered arbitrary - the Krugman (1979) first generation model being a case in point. The 
incentive for investors to gather information may be explored within this portfolio 
diversification model. 
Let there be an unspecified fixed cost involved in learning about country k. Assume 
that the learning costs allow the agent to obtain information about returns in the country with 
certainty (i.e. σ1
2  = 0). From eq. (4):   
 
(1 - ∅) = [1 + ε/(νϒ) ] .         ( 4
l) 
 
Assuming no short sales, the following relationship between the range of values of ε 




(1 - ∅) 
[0, ∞)  1 
[- νϒ, 0)  (0, 1) 
(-∞, - νϒ)  0 
 
From the above conditions we see that for ε ≥ 0, as long as the fixed information costs are not 
prohibitively large, there is gain to be had from information gathering ex-post. Conversely, 
for ε ≤ -νϒ, there is no ex-post gain to be reaped from information gathering. What about the 
intermediate case of ε = [-νϒ, 0)? As J  ∞, there is no ex-post gain to be had, as the i.i.d. 
distribution of returns ensures that a highly diversified portfolio will provide a return of ρ 
which exceeds r (as ε = r - ρ). On the other hand, for small J, ex-post utility could still 
increase with information gathering. Putting all this together and assuming continuity, we 
reach the conclusion that the marginal gain of information gathering about any single country 
falls as portfolios get increasingly diversified internationally. 
  The second generation (escape clause-based) multiple equilibria models a la Obstfeld 
(1994, 1996) require the existence of a range or zone of weakness (i.e. “gray area”) in which a 
currency is potentially vulnerable to a speculative attack. In contrast, the Calvo-Mendoza   8
model does not necessarily require the existence of any actual macroeconomic weaknesses. 
Rather, just a rumor of such vulnerabilities may suffice to generate large-scale reallocation of 
funds away from one destination to another, making small open economies susceptible to 
large swings in capital flows and costly boom-bust cycles. In this light, the Calvo-Mendoza 
model is most appropriately seen as an open economy extension of the information-based 
herding and cascades genre of models that have been recently developed to explain herding 
behavior in domestic financial markets (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000). 
  
3. Empirical  Analysis 
As noted, the recovery in capital flows in the region has been primarily due to a 
rebound in portfolio flows (as opposed to bank loans). It would therefore be useful to explore 
the determinants of private portfolio capital flows to the Asia-5 economies. We also include 
Singapore in the analysis in view of the important role it plays as a regional trade and 
financial hub. To be sure, no attempt is made here to provide a fully specified regression 
analysis
6. Rather, insofar as the recovery in portfolio capital flows has been accompanied by a 
rebound in regional output and currencies (ADB-ARIC, 2002), we examine the importance of 
the nominal exchange rate (nominal variable) and GDP (real variable) in determining 
portfolio flows in the Asia-5 economies
7. What is the rationale for doing this?  
A broader interpretation of the information frictional-based Calvo-Mendoza model is 
that small rumors or bad “news” could trigger capital outflows as investors, spoilt for choice, 
may not undertake detailed country evaluations when making investment decisions. Exchange 
rates and GDP are among the most timely and easily available data of a country’s economic 
performance. As such, one would expect a priori these variables to be important determinants 
of portfolio flows. For instance, exchange rate volatility could diminish the extent of capital 
flows into a country and therefore negatively impact stock market returns as well. Carlson and 
                                                           
6 Dasgupta and Ratha (2000) do undertake a regression analysis of both portfolio and FDI flows. 
However, absent a theoretical framework, their results, while interesting, are open to criticism of 
misspecification.  
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Hernandez (2002) find that countries with floating exchange rate regimes tend to have a 
smaller share of portfolio equity and FDI in total capital inflows. Two important caveats are 
in order.  
First, while data on exchange rates are available on a daily basis, those on portfolio 
flows are available only on a quarterly basis from the early 1990s, and even then there are 
questions about the reliability of such balance-of-payments data. For instance, we are unable 
to decompose private portfolio capital flows into equity and debt. Accordingly, our analysis 
of the magnitude of portfolio flows is complemented by one involving a price corollary, i.e. 
stock market returns, for which higher frequency data are available. In particular, we assume 
that the higher the stock market returns in a country, the greater will be the portfolio flows to 
that country.  
  Second, there is clearly a circular reasoning at work, as changes in capital flows and 
stock returns ought in turn to affect the nominal exchange rate and overall economic 
performance including GDP growth (Mishra et al., 2001). In other words, there is inevitably a 
two-way interaction which creates an endogeneity problem. To overcome this we make use of 
the conventional Granger-causality tests to ascertain the direction of causation. While our 
interest, based on theory, is in whether private capital flows are influenced by the variables 
under consideration, we examine bi-directional Granger-causation for completeness. A 
general specification of our test in the bi-variate context (X, Y) may be expressed as: 
 
   t i t i i i i t i t X Y Y 1 1 1 1 1 ε β α + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − = = −        (7) 
 
   t i t i i i i t i t X Y X 2 1 2 1 2 ε β α + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − = = −        (8) 
 
where εt is a white noise error term and ∆ is the first difference operator. All variables are in 
the log-forms. The Granger-causality test examines the statistical significance of the ∆Xt  in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7  The descriptions of relevant variables for the empirical section are summarized in Table 2.   10
explaining ∆Yt  (Eq. 7) and vice-versa in (Eq. 8). For the sake of brevity, we will only report 
the significant test results. 
We are cognizant of the limitations the Granger-causality test. There exist more 
“structural approaches” to examine interdependence of different variables than the 
conventional Granger-causality test, such as cointegration tests between variables based on a 
more fully specified theoretical model (Dickinson, 2000)
8. Nonetheless, Granger-causality 
remains a useful and widely used statistical test, particularly in instances of limited degrees of 
freedom (see Kwan et al. 1995, for instance). Another popular test is the correlation test. 
However, the power of this test has been questioned for various reasons (Dungey and 
Zhumabekova, 2001).   
   
3.1   Exchange Rates and Stock Exchange Indices 
  We begin our empirical investigation by first examining the nexus between exchange 
rate volatility and stock market performance. Unlike the other variables (portfolio flows and 
output), data for both these variables are available on a daily basis from January 1, 1996 to 
July 1, 2001, offering far greater degrees of freedom. We use lags of five and ten days
9. 
Since the volatility rates are also strongly determined by the type of exchange regime 
adopted, it is important in the first instance to understand the kind of arrangements that were 
in place at different periods in East Asia, particularly pre and post-1997 crisis. Building on the 
work of Frankel and Wei (1993), McKinnon (2000) concluded that the Asia-5 economies 
reverted to their pre-crisis US dollar soft pegged exchange rate policies. Using daily and 
weekly nominal exchange rate observations he finds that there was a temporary adoption of 
more flexible regimes during the height of the crisis (July 1997 to December 1998). However, 
starting from January 1999, the test results suggest a similar degree of tightness of the 
                                                           
8 We have evaluated the unit-root properties of the variables using the ADF unit-root test and the KPSS 
unit-root test. All variables are integrated of order 1 at the level or I(1) at a 5 percent critical value 
except the GARCH(1,1) volatility exchange rate series which is I(0). Detailed results are available 
upon request. 
 
9 Our results have shown that the significant results can be found only either at 5 or 10 lags.   11
regional currencies to the US dollar as existed pre-crisis
.. Lim (2002) extends the study to 
cover observations until November 2001 and confirms McKinnon’s results
10. 
To test the implication of nominal exchange rate volatility of the Asia-5 economies 
for their respective stock returns (as well as those of each other), we first estimate the 
volatility rates using the following GARCH (1,1) specification:  
 
  t t t e NER a a NER + + = −1 1 0 ln ln , where  ) , 0 ( ~ t t h N e     (9) 
  t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α .           ( 1 0 )  
 
The variable (NER) represents the daily nominal exchange rate of the various East Asian 
currencies against the US dollar. The conditional variance equation (Eq. 10) described above 
is a function of three terms: (i) the mean, α ; (ii) news about volatility from the previous 
period, measured as the lag of the squared residual from the mean equation, 
2
1 − t e  (the 
ARCH term); and (iii) last period’s forecast error variance,  1 − t h  (the GARCH term). We do 
not include the Malaysian ringgit for the crisis and the post-crisis tests as Malaysia adopted a 
fixed exchange rate in September 1998 as part of a larger macroeconomic package which 
included the imposition of capital controls (Athukorala, 2001 and Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001).  
We divide the daily observations into three sets. The pre-crisis, the crisis and the 
post-crisis periods. These periods respectively cover the daily observations from January 1, 
1996 to December 31, 1996; January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998; and from January 1, 
2000 to July 1, 2001. By breaking the observation samples into three separate periods 
according to the economic condition of the country, we avoid potential structural breaks in the 
                                                           
10 Hernandez and Montiel (2001), who analyse the evidence regarding post-crisis exchange rate 
policies pursued in the Asia-5 economies, conclude as follows. 
contrary to the views of some observers…there has indeed been a change in de facto 
exchange rate regimes in all five of these countries between the pre- and post-crisis 
periods. While none of them have adopted “soft pegs” with unfettered capital 
movements, neither have they moved to the extreme corner solutions of “hard” pegs or 
clean floats. In other words, all of them have continued to manage their exchange rates 
in an active manner..and have thus occupied the supposed “hollow middle” of 
exchange rate policy (p.16).   12
observation sets. Dungey and Zhumabekova (2001) have argued persuasively that the 
transition from a non-crisis to crisis period usually involves an alteration in the volatility of 
the error term, i.e. the assumption of homocedasticity is violated. This problem is even worse 
when we have “unbalanced sample sets” where for instance we have more non-crisis period 
observations than the crisis data within one testing sample set.   
Table 3 reports the coefficient estimates for β and γ
11. Partly reflecting the temporary 
abandonment of the soft US dollar regime, we find that, on average, the volatility rates during 
the crisis have been significantly higher than those in the pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods. 
During the peak of the crisis period (January - December 1998), the Indonesian rupiah 
experienced the most dramatic increase in the rate of volatility, some 350 times higher than 
during the pre-crisis period (Table 3b). The volatility of the Philippine peso also escalated 
sharply (230 times the pre-crisis period), as did that of the Thai baht (50 times the pre-crisis 
period). Even the Singapore dollar and the Korean won, which have been among the 
relatively more stable regional currencies, experienced 20 and 30 times higher rates of 
volatility during the crisis period. However, as the economies recovered and reverted to the de 
facto soft US dollar pegged regimes, the volatility rates have been relatively more moderate in 
2000-01. Although the post-crisis volatility (January 2000 - July 2001) of the nominal 
exchange rates has been discernibly higher than during the pre-crisis period, the increase in 
the volatility rates between these two periods was significantly smaller than those reported 
between the crisis and pre-crisis periods. The Indonesian rupiah and the Philippine peso 
continue to experience the most severe volatility during the post-crisis period.  
As expected, the test results for the periods of “moderate volatility” (viz. the pre and 
post-crisis) offer limited evidence that exchange rate volatility has played any significant role 
in explaining the returns of the listed stocks of the East Asian capital markets (Table 4 and 6). 
As noted above, stable currencies resulted from the tight exchange rate arrangement adopted 
during the pre-crisis. This probably explains the limited “causality” between the exchange 
                                                           
11  For the brevity of the paper, we do not report the volatility figures for each of the nominal exchange 
rates. However, the results can be made available upon request.   13
rate and stock returns. As for the post-crisis period, the combination of moderate volatility 
and the relatively weak market confidence in most of the capital markets in East Asia may 
rationalize the rather poor Granger-causality test results (Table 6).  
In marked contrast, there is strong evidence of the impact of currency volatility on 
stock market returns during the peak of the crisis as reported in Table 5. With the exception of 
Singapore stock market index, the performance of all other stock exchange indices was highly 
influenced by the movements of the regional currencies. The volatility of the Indonesian 
rupiah and the Korean won are found to be important contributory factors in explaining the 
returns on the Jakarta stock exchange as well as other capital markets included in the test. The 
volatile peso was another influential currency, affecting every market except Singapore.   
Variations in the Thai baht also contributed to the poor performance of the Thailand stock 
exchange as well as those in the Indonesian and Korean stock markets.  
The relatively strong results for the crisis period not only reflect the breakdown of the 
rigid exchange rate regimes during the crisis period but may also highlight the vulnerabilities 
of a country due to its de facto high degree of market integration with other countries. It is 
plausible that during the crisis period, the economic performance of one country (as reflected 
in a commonly available economic indicator like currency value) has a relatively stronger 
impact on other markets in the region. This may occur for a number of reasons. A weakness 
in or attack on one currency could lead to a wholesale reassessment of the region’s 
“fundamentals” and the probability of a similar fate befalling regional economies with 
broadly similar macroeconomic stances (whether actual or perceived). This information 
updating is popularly termed the “wake-up call” effect (Ahluwalia, 2000). This phenomenon 
could also refer to the sudden realization of how little market participants truly understand 
about the regional economies, leading to a region-wide downgrading/sell-off. Mullainthan 
(1998) has developed a model in which investors recall past events imperfectly. Accordingly, 
a new crisis all of a sudden reminds them of previous crises and induces them to reassess the 
probabilities of an adverse outcome. In related literature, Drazen (1998) has developed a 
contagion model which is based on economies being in an implicit or explicit   14
currency/monetary union. Thus, devaluation by one economy acts as a wake up call to 
investors in the sense that it leads them to question the commitment of other regional 
economies to maintain “club membership” by not devaluing. Dooley (2000) suggests that the 
“bunching together” of crises may be due to revisions in the effective size of official lines of 
credit available to the regional governments to defend the currency (either from international 
agencies or ad hoc bilateral, multilateral agreements).  
 
3.2  Exchange Rates and Portfolio Flows 
  As noted, we would ideally have liked to determine the impact of exchange rate 
volatility on portfolio flows during the three sub-periods. To our knowledge, daily data or 
weekly data are not available for portfolio flows, hence precluding such a task. Due to a 
limited number of observations, the empirical tests for this sub-section cannot be divided into 
pre-and post-crisis period, except in the cases of the Philippines and the Korea (Table 2). For 
the full period set, we include a crisis dummy in the Granger-causality equation (Eqs. 7 and 8) 
so as to capture the possible structural changes associated with the break caused by the 1997 
crisis
12.  In addition, we estimate two sets of exchange rate variables, viz. the GARCH(1,1) 
volatility and ∆NEX (quarterly/monthly change in the nominal exchange rate). We do this so 
as to extract, in a more conclusive manner, the nexus between exchange rate volatility and 
capital flows
13. Malaysia is excluded from the analysis given data limitations and the 
country’s adoption of capital controls.  
  Test results suggest that the volatility of the nominal exchange rate does not Granger-
cause fluctuations in portfolio flows for the emerging markets of the Southeast Asia except 
Indonesia (Table 7). In fact, for Indonesia and Singapore, the causality between portfolio 
investment and exchange rate runs both ways during the full period of pre- and post-crisis. 
                                                           
12  The crisis dummy equals zero up to quarter 1, 1986 to quarter 1, 1997 and one otherwise.  
 
13  The GARCH(1,1) results are the same as posted in Table 3. For the monthly/quarterly numbers, we 
just take the daily average for the month or quarter. ∆NEX equals to ( 1 − − t t NEX NEX ).   15
For the post-crisis period, the direction of causality was from Korean won to portfolio 
investment. 
 
3.3  GDP and Portfolio Investment  
  A number of studies, such as Ferson and Harvey (1993), Levine and Zervos (1995) 
and Dickinson (2000) have examined the roles of macroeconomic fundamentals in explaining 
the performance of stock markets. Wolf (1999) groups the macro-fundamentals into three 
categories: (a) performance indicators (GDP, exports, investment); (b) the structure indicator 
of the economy (share of exports in GDP); and (c) risk indicators (ratio of debt to GDP, 
current account deficit). Given the substantial swings in the GDP growth rate of the crisis-
affected economies in East Asia, our empirical test focuses on examining the role of 
macroeconomic performance (GDP growth) on portfolio investment in the domestic 
economy.   
A few results from Table 8 warrant highlighting. For the more developed economies 
in East Asia, viz. Korea and Singapore, the change in GDP growth rates Granger-cause 
portfolio flows in these countries. As for the rest of the Southeast Asian economies, portfolio 
investment flows Granger-cause GDP growth in Indonesia and Thailand with the t-statistics 
showing statistical significance at the 5 percent level. For Indonesia, the country’s GDP 
growth rate has also significantly influenced the flow of portfolio capital to the country. This 
last finding may help explain the drastic fall in the values of portfolio investment as Indonesia 
experienced a sharp contraction in real economic activity in 1998.     
 
4.  Interdependencies Between the Regional Capital Markets 
The potential importance of the extent of interdependence of regional equity market 
has been highlighted in the preceding section. A rumour of vulnerabilities in one of the 
regional markets may suffice to generate large scale of reallocation of funds away from one 
region to another. In this section we examine the daily returns of portfolio assets in the Asia-5   16
economies which are tested against each other to unearth any evidence of causality between 
them, as well as to estimate the variance decomposition of each forecast error. 
 
4.1  Causality Test  
Table 9 to 11 report the Granger-causality tests during the pre-1997 crisis period 
(January 1, 1995 to December 31, 1996), the height of the crisis period (January 1, 1998 to 
December 31, 1998) and the post-crisis period (January 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001)
14. In addition, 
we also examine the roles of the Hong Kong Hang Seng Index and the US Dow Jones index 
in influencing the performance of the East Asian markets. We impose up to 10 lags (2 weeks 
(5 working days per week) and report only the statistically significant results
15 
The test results indicate that relatively limited degrees of integration among the 
Southeast Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) had 
already been established during the pre-1997 crisis (Table 9). The returns of each of the 
Southeast Asian markets influenced the returns of at least two other neighbouring capital 
markets. The returns of the Indonesian stock exchange are influenced significantly by the 
performances of the rest of the Southeast Asian stock markets, except Malaysia.   
Furthermore, the fluctuations in the composite price index of the US Dow Jones and the Hong 
Kong Hang Seng strongly influenced the Southeast Asian markets during the pre-1997 crisis. 
These findings are broadly consistent with that of Calvo et. al (1996) who stress the roles of 
global leaders in the world capital markets. In contrast, we fail to find any evidence of 
Granger-Causality between the Southeast Asian markets and Korean capital markets.  
At the peak of the 1997 East Asian crisis, the results indicate a closer link among the 
stock market returns of the crisis-affected economies (Table 10). In particular, the 
performance of Korea Stock Exchange Composite Price Index (KOSPI) was influenced by 
the returns of the Southeast Asian capital markets (except the Philippines), while reciprocally, 
                                                           
14  The capital market return is calculated as the difference of the log of stock exchange index   
[ ) ln( ) ln( 1 − − t t sxi sxi ]. 
  
15  In general, we find that the most significant t-statistics are found at lags = 2, 4 or 6. In fact, no   17
the returns of listed stocks in the capital market of Korea significantly Granger-caused the 
returns of two markets in Southeast Asia (Philippines and Thailand) and Hong Kong. More 
importantly, test results also reveal that the two worst crisis-afflicted stock exchanges, 
Indonesia and Thailand, had the most widespread spillover effects at the peak of the 1997 
crisis. These findings seem to lend more support to the Calvo-Mendoza model. News about 
one of the East Asian markets had significant repercussions on other neighboring markets 
during the height of the 1997 crisis. In addition, the Dow Jones remains the most important 
market for the East Asian capital markets, reflected by the highest set of F-statistics. 
The results for the post-crisis period suggest a pointed fall in the degree of regional 
stock market integration (Table 11). For instance, the returns on the assets listed on the 
Jakarta (Indonesia) and the Philippines Stock Exchanges had no significant influence on any 
other regional markets. This may suggest a decoupling of the regional economies and markets 
during the post-crisis period. 
 
4.2 Variance  Decomposition 
  To appreciate further the degrees of stock market integration among the crisis 
affected economies, we test the forecast error decomposition of the daily stock exchange 
returns of the five heavily crisis-affected economies (Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Korea 
and Singapore) during the three different periods as listed above (Table 12-14). 
  In general, we find the error variance for each of the stock returns is largely explained 
by its own innovation. In fact, at most only about 30 percent of the variations in each regional 
stock return can be explained by the returns of other markets during each of the three periods. 
With the exception of the US dollar for Singapore in all three periods and for Korea during 
the last period (2000-01), the fluctuations of other stock market returns contributed less than 
10 percent of variations in each of the Asia-5 stock returns. 
  Consistent with the causality results, we find that, on average, the fluctuations in the 
returns of the regional markets and the US markets impacted one another more during the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
significant results are found at 10 or more lags.   18
height of the crisis (Table 13) than during the pre-crisis, except for Indonesia and Singapore. 
Furthermore, the impact of stock returns in Indonesia on the rest of the crisis-affected 
economies has increased by as much as 2 percent. As for the rest of the markets, we find no 
consistent trend with regard to their impact on regional capital markets.  
Lastly, higher percentage shares of error variances in the five markets are explained 
by their own innovations during the post crisis period than the pre-crisis period and the height 
of the crisis period, except for the case of Korea. The results for the post-crisis period 
confirms our previous conclusion that there has been a pointed fall in the degree of market 
integration in these economies as reported by the causality test results.        
 
5.   Concluding Remarks 
  Capital volatility causes problems for macroeconomic management. But similarly, 
macroeconomic policy and performance may influence international capital flows. The nature 
of the interaction between macroeconomic variables and capital flows is indeed highly 
complex. This paper sets out to examine one part of it by investigating the empirical 
relationship between portfolio equity flows, on the one hand, and exchange rate volatility and 
GDP performance across five Asian economies, on the other. We also examine regional 
interdependences between the capital markets in the Asia-5 economies. 
  The paper builds on a theoretical model that suggests that investors may be 
influenced by aspects of economic policy and performance that are relatively easy to monitor. 
This is used to justify our choice of the nominal exchange rate and GDP. Because of data 
constraints we assume that portfolio equity flows will be influenced by stock market returns. 
The theory also strongly underlines herding behavior in regional financial markets; a rumor in 
one market may be enough to generate speculative attacks in most regional markets.   
  Although there are some differences across countries, we find evidence that 
instability in the nominal exchange rate and GDP performance are associated with stock 
market returns and portfolio equity flows. Simple Granger causality tests suggest that these 
measures of economic policy and performance may exert a causal impact on portfolio equity   19
investment, although in some cases the causal relationship may be two way. One inference is 
that exchange rate instability and not just expectations of a fall in the value of a currency may 
negatively impact capital inflows. Moreover, we find that instability in the value of a currency 
may not only affect the domestic stock market but also the stock markets of regional 
countries. 
Our evidence suggests that, to the extent that governments can influence exchange 
rates and economic growth, they can also influence portfolio equity flows. The adoption of a 
more relaxed exchange rate policy at the peak of the 1997 financial crisis clearly resulted in 
much more severe exchange rate volatilities in all the regional currencies that we tested. In 
turn, the rise in the degrees of uncertainty in the regional currency markets not only had more 
significant but also much wider impacts on regional capital markets.  Concern that freely 
floating exchange rates will be unstable and will discourage portfolio equity investment may 
be another reason why governments in Asia have exhibited a “fear of floating” (Kim, 2000 
makes a broadly similar point).  
While economic growth rates in East and Southeast Asia was rapid, the regional 
interdependences among the stock exchange markets were found to be only moderate, with 
domestic economic and other factors may having more weight in influencing the performance 
of local stock exchanges. In contrast, the returns in other regional markets became a 
significant determinant of the returns in local stock markets during the peak of the 1997 
financial crisis. Clearly supporting the theoretical model in section 2 of the paper, the 
empirical results show that the small open economies in the Southeast Asian region have been 
more susceptible to swings in the stock exchange returns of large markets such as the United 
States.       
Although modest in ambition the paper adds something to our knowledge of capital 
flows. At a time when capital volatility and the choice of exchange rate regime remain central 
issues in the context of designing the new international financial architecture (Bird and Rajan, 
2002), research that shows linkages between them is of contemporary relevance. Equally 
important is the observation that the regional interdependences among neighboring markets   20
heighten during a financial crisis. One caveat should be noted here however. As 
acknowledged already in the empirical section, with the lack of high frequency data for some 
of our variables preventing us to group the series and the test into the pre- and post-crisis sets, 
the power of our quarterly testing may be limited. This, in some cases, may lead to 
insignificant results that we have discussed in section 3.   21
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Table 1 
Net Capital Flows to East Asia, 1995-2001 
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Private Capital Flows 
Direct Investment 
Portfolio Investment 





























































Notes:    a) Asia-5 economies denote Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea and Thailand; b) Minus sign   
denotes a rise and vice versa 
Source:  IMF (2001) 
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Table 2: Descriptions of Variables 
 
 





Daily observations for all countries are available 
from January 1, 1996 – December 31, 2001. 
 





a). For Philippines and Korea, monthly 
observations are available from January 1990 – 
December 2001. 
 
b). For Indonesia: quarter 1, 1986 – quarter 4, 
2001. For Singapore: quarter 1, 1990 – quarter 4, 
2001. For Thailand: quarter 1, 1990 – quarter 4, 
2001. 
 
CEIC Data Base, and 
DATASTREAM data base. 
 
3). Real GDP 
 
Quarterly data for all countries from quarter 1, 
1986 to quarter 4, 2001. 
 
The Econometrics Study Unit 
(ESU), Department of 
Economics, National 




against the US$ 
 
All nominal exchange rates are available in both 
daily and monthly series. 
For daily: January 1, 1996 – December 31, 2001. 
For monthly: January 1986 – December 2001. 
 
Pacific Exchange Rate Data 
Base for the daily data. 
International Financial 
Statistics, CD-Roam for the 
monthly data. 
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Table 3: Exchange Rate Volatility Coefficients 
 
t t t t u h e h + + + = − − 1
2
1 γ β α . 
 
January 1996 - December 1996  (ARCH)  β   β   β   β (GARCH)    γ γ γ γ 
Indonesian rupiah  0.1714  (0.0585)**   
Malaysian ringgit  0.1714  (0.0653)**    
Philippines peso  0.1714  (0.0758)**   
Thailand bath  0.1711  (0.0674)**   
Singapore dollar  0.1668  (0.0629)**   
Korea won  0.1499  (0.0691)**  0.6000 (0.0000)* 
    
January 1998 - December 1998    
Indonesian rupiah  0.0612  (0.0139)*  0.8884  (0.0150)* 
Philippines peso  0.1939  (0.0711)*  0.6762  (0.0814)* 
Thailand bath  0.2355  (0.0614)*  0.6637  (0.0759)* 
Singapore dollar  0.1894  (0.0572)*  0.6657  (0.0868)* 
Korea won  0.2001  (0.0579)*  0.7279  (0.0437)* 
    
January 2000 - July 2001    
Indonesian rupiah  0.1269  (0.0240)*  0.7683  (0.0210)* 
Philippines peso  0.2479  (0.0209)*  0.6664  (0.0264)* 
Thailand bath  0.1655  (0.0538)*  0.6124  (0.1126)* 
Singapore dollar  0.0925  (0.0564)**  0.5978  (0.2913)* 
Korea won  0.1871  (0.0378)*  0.7283  (0.0459)* 
 
* 5% significant; ** 10% significant; (  ) are the standard errors. With the exception of Thai 
bath and Malaysian ringgit in 1996---where the series are ARCH(1), the rest of the nominal 





Table 3b: Mean of Conditional Variance 
 
  Jan 1996- Dec 1996  Jan 1998 - Dec 1998  Jan 2000 - July 2001 
Rupiah 0.000008  0.002836  0.000222 
Peso 0.0000005  0.000136  0.000086 
Baht 0.000005  0.000242  0.000016 
Singapore Dollar  0.000004  0.000086  0.000012 
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Table 4: Exchange Rate Volatility on the Stock Exchange Returns 
(Period: January 1, 1996 – December 31, 1996) 
 





Volatility of Ringgit does not Granger Cause Return of Malaysia Stock  241  (5)  1.9989  (0.0796) 
Volatility of Ringgit does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines Stock  241  (5)  2.1034  (0.0659) 
Volatility of Ringgit does not Granger Cause Return of Singapore Stock  241  (10)  1.7434  (0.0728) 
    




Table 5: Exchange Rate Volatility on the Stock Exchange Returns 
(Period: January 1, 1998 – December 31, 1998) 
 




Volatility of Rupiah does not Granger Cause Return of Indonesia Stock  238  (10)  1.6979  (0.0826) 
Volatility of Won does not Granger Cause Return of Indonesia Stock  238  (10)  2.7612  (0.0032) 
Volatility of Bath does not Granger Cause Return of Indonesia Stock  238  (10)  4.1115  (0.0000) 
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Indonesia Stock  238  (10)  1.7218  (0.0773) 
    
Volatility of Rupiah does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  238  (5)  1.9177  (0.0092) 
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  238  (5)  2.7387  (0.0199) 
Volatility of Bath does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  238  (10)  1.6369  (0.0976) 
Volatility of Sing Dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  238  (5)  1.9849  (0.0817) 
Volatility of Won does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  238  (5)  1.9380  (0.0888) 
    
Volatility of Rupiah does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines Stock  238  (5)  3.8726  (0.0022) 
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines Stock  238  (5)  3.1175  (0.0096) 
Volatility of Sing Dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines 
Stock 
238  (5)  2.1227  (0.0636) 
Volatility of Won does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines Stock  238  (5)  2.4449  (0.0349) 
    
Volatility of Rupiah does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  238  (5)  4.5824  (0.0005) 
Volatility of Won does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  238  (5)  3.0768  (0.0104) 
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  238  (10)  1.7023  (0.0816) 
Volatility of Bath does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  238  (10)  2.0774  (0.0274) 
Volatility of Sing Dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  238  (10)  1.6342  (0.0984) 
    
Volatility of Rupiah does not Granger Cause Return of Singapore Stock  238  (5)  5.5977  (0.0000) 
Volatility of won does not Granger Cause Return of Singapore Stock  238  (5)  7.2268  (0.0000) 
    
 
Note: The Malaysian case is excluded due to capital control policy and fixed exchange rate policy 
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Table 6: Exchange Rate Volatility on the Stock Exchange Returns 
(Period: January 1, 2000 – July 1, 2001) 
 
 





Volatility of Sing Dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Indonesia Stock  375  (5)  2.4989  (0.0305) 
    
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Philippines Stock  375  (5)  2.9612  (0.0124) 
    
Volatility of Sing dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  375  (5)  2.0464  (0.0716) 
Volatility of Baht does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  375  (5)  1.9727  (0.0819) 
Volatility of Peso dollar does not Granger Cause Return of Thailand Stock  375  (5)  2.6506  (0.0227) 
    
Volatility of Peso does not Granger Cause Return of Korea Stock  375  (5)  2.1642  (0.0575) 
 
Note: The Malaysian case is excluded due to capital control policy and fixed exchange rate policy 




Table 7: Exchange Rate and Portfolio Investment (PI) 
 
 




∆PI does not Granger Cause ∆NEX of won for January 1990 – January 1997 
 
∆NEX of won does not Granger Cause ∆PI for January 1998-January 2001 
Volatility of won does not Granger Cause ∆PI for January 1998-January 2001 
 
78  (6) 
 
48  (6) 





2.5292  (0.0386) 
2.8539  (0.0228) 
 
Indonesia: 
∆NEX of rupiah does not Granger Cause ∆PI for quarter 1, 1986 - quarter 4, 2001 
∆PI does not Granger Cause ∆NEX of rupiah for quarter 1, 1986 - quarter 4, 2001 
∆PI does not Granger Cause Volatility of rupiah for quarter 1,1986-quarter 4,2001 
 
 
60  (2) 
60  (2) 











∆PI does not Granger Cause ∆NEX of dollar for quarter 1, 1990 - quarter 4, 2001 
∆NEX of dollar does not Granger Cause ∆PI for quarter 1, 1990 – quarter 4, 2001 
 
 
48  (2) 








Note: The Malaysian case is excluded due to capital control policy and fixed exchange rate policy 
adopted in September 1998. 
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Table 8: GDP and Portfolio Investment (PI) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis  # of obs (lags)  F-Stat (Prob) 
Indonesia: 
∆PI does not Granger Cause ∆GDP for quarter 1,1986 - quarter 4, 2001 
∆GDP does not Granger Cause ∆PI for quarter 1, 1990 – quarter 4, 2001 
 
 
64  (2) 







∆GDP does not Granger Cause ∆PI for quarter 1, 1990 – quarter 4, 2001 
 
 





∆PI does not Granger Cause ∆GDP for quarter 1, 1990 - quarter 4, 2001   
 


















Table 9: Granger-Causality on the Stock Exchange Returns 
Period: January 1, 1996 - December 31, 1996 
 
  
Null Hypothesis  # of Obs (lags)  F-stats (Prob) 
 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Indonesia  242  (2)  9.9080  (0.0001) 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Malaysia  242  (2)  2.5121  (0.0832) 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Thailand  242  (2)  2.2404  (0.1000) 
    
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Malaysia  242  (2)  2.3579  (0.0968) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  242  (2)  5.0705  (0.0069) 
    
Malaysia does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  242  (2)  3.4824  (0.0323) 
Malaysia does not Granger Cause Singapore  242  (4)  2.1104  (0.0803) 
    
Philippines does not Granger Cause Indonesia  242  (2)  2.3529  (0.0973) 
Philippines does not Granger Cause Thailand  242  (2)  6.9427  (0.0018) 
    
Thailand does not Granger Cause Indonesia  242  (2)  4.9711  (0.0077) 
Thailand does not Granger Cause Philippines  242  (2)  3.7774  (0.0243) 
    
Singapore does not Granger Cause Indonesia  242  (2)  5.6611  (0.0039) 
Singapore does not Granger Cause Malaysia  242  (2)  3.4478  (0.0334) 
    
USA does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  242  (2)  54.515  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Indonesia  242  (2)  11.081  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Malaysia  242  (2)  14.956  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Philippines  242  (2)  7.2885  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Singapore  242  (2)  20.033  (0.0000) 
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Table 10: Granger Causality on the Stock Exchange Returns 
Period: January 1, 1998 – December 31, 1998 
 
 
Null Hypothesis  # of Obs (lags)  F-stats (Prob) 
 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Korea  249 (2)  2.9842  (0.0525) 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  3.3062  (0.0383) 
    
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  249 (2)  11.388  (0.0000) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Korea  249 (2)  3.6757  (0.0268) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Singapore  249 (2)  4.7085  (0.0099) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  5.8752  (0.0032) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause Thailand  249 (2)  4.1054  (0.0176) 
Indonesia does not Granger Cause USA  249 (2)  5.0108  (0.0074) 
    
Korea does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  7.7611  (0.0005) 
Korea does not Granger Cause Thailand  249 (2)  4.6059  (0.0109) 
Korea does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  249 (2)  3.7780 (0.0242) 
    
Philippines does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  249 (2)  10.557  (0.0000) 
Philippines does not Granger Cause USA  249 (2)  4.1743  (0.0165) 
Philippines does not Granger Cause Singapore  249 (2)  6.1567  (0.0025) 
    
Thailand does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  249 (2)  8.4097  (0.0003) 
Thailand does not Granger Cause Korea  249 (2)  2.6809  (0.0705) 
Thailand does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  3.4172  (0.0344) 
Thailand does not Granger Cause Singapore  249 (2)  2.8589  (0.0593) 
Thailand does not Granger Cause USA  249 (2)  3.1102  (0.0464) 
    
Singapore does not Granger Cause Korea  249 (2)  4.1467  (0.0169) 
Singapore does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  2.3565  (0.0969) 
    
USA does not Granger Cause Hong Kong  249 (2)  9.6092  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Indonesia  249 (2)  3.1401  (0.0451) 
USA does not Granger Cause Korea  249 (2)  3.6214  (0.0282) 
USA does not Granger Cause Philippines  249 (2)  10.070  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Thailand  249 (2)  10.026  (0.0000) 
USA does not Granger Cause Singapore  249 (2)  3.2541  (0.0403) 
 
Note: The Malaysian case is excluded due to capital control policy and fixed exchange rate 
policy adopted in September 1998.   31
 
Table 11: Granger-Causality Test on the Stock Exchange Returns 
 
(Period: January 1, 2000 – July 1, 2001) 
 
 
Null Hypothesis  # of Obs (lags)  F-statistics (Prob) 
 
Hong Kong does not Granger Cause Singapore  388 (2)  3.4139 (0.0339) 
    
Korea does Granger Cause Philippines  388 (2)  7.0784 (0.0009) 
Korea does Granger Cause Thailand  388 (2)  4.3598 (0.0135) 
    
Singapore does Granger Cause Philippines  388 (2)  3.2728 (0.0390) 
Singapore does Granger Cause Indonesia  388 (2)   2.6593 (0.0714)  
    
Thailand does Granger Cause Philippines  388 (2)  4.3080 (0.0132) 
Thailand does Granger Cause Indonesia  388 (2)  2.7565 (0.0648) 
    
USA does Granger Cause Hong Kong  388 (2)  53.262 (0.0000) 
USA does Granger Cause Korea  388 (2)  24.342 (0.0000) 
USA does Granger Cause Philippines  388 (2)  6.0886 (0.0025) 
USA does Granger Cause Singapore  388 (2)  31.812 (0.0000) 
USA does Granger Cause Thailand  388 (2)  7.9173 (0.0004) 
 
Note: The Malaysian case is excluded due to capital control policy and fixed exchange rate 
policy adopted in September 1998.   32
Table 12: Variance Decomposition 




Period Indonesia USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 75.08  7.21  3.67 8.05 2.66  3.03 0.31 
10 69.54 6.92 5.32  7.58  3.10 6.91  0.63 
 
Thailand: 
Period Thailand  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 88.41  0.69  1.54 0.62 1.95  6.45 0.34 
10 77.69 1.51 1.63  1.98  3.86  9.94  3.37 
 
Philippines: 
Period Philippines  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Korea 
1  100  0  0  0 0 0 0 
5  85.06 3.68  3.28  0.48 0.77 4.28 2.45 
10  75.36 4.22  3.06  4.51 2.89 6.71 3.28 
 
Korea: 
Period  Korea USA Singapore  Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Philippines 
1 100 0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 89.99  1.67  1.94 0.13 3.83  1.03  1.41 
10 82.49  3.49 2.67  0.99  4.11  3.56  2.89 
 
Singapore: 
Period Singapore USA  Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 75.61  17.07  0.39  0.73 1.97  0.52 3.71 
10 67.32 16.46  2.64  3.35  2.54 2.87  4.83 
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Table 13: Variance Decomposition  
 
(Daily Observations from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998) 
 
Indonesia: 
Period Indonesia USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 86.08  2.94  1.31 4.83 0.61  1.06 3.17 
10 77.61 3.69 2.48  5.35  6.31 1.59  2.96 
 
Thailand: 
Period Thailand  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 81.17  6.09  0.71 0.82 3.02  3.73 4.47 
10 72.87 8.22 1.51  2.03  5.93  4.02  5.43 
 
Philippines: 
Period Philippines  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Korea 
1  100  0  0  0 0 0 0 
5  78.06 8.97  2.82  2.89 2.46 1.56 3.24 
10  68.96 8.81  3.66  3.69 3.12 4.65 7.10 
 
Korea: 
Period  Korea USA Singapore  Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Philippines 
1 100 0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 83.87  3.78  6.18 1.54 3.33  0.76  0.54 
10 75.26  5.45 7.68  3.57  4.85  2.18  1.03 
 
Singapore: 
Period Singapore USA  Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 79.78  8.64  0.67  2.81 1.93  3.85 2.32 
10 73.13 10.07  2.09  3.94  4.12 3.72  2.92 
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Table 14: Variance Decomposition  
 
(Daily Observations from January 1, 2000 to July 1, 2001) 
 
Indonesia: 
Period Indonesia USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 92.80  1.54  2.61 0.59 1.11  0.95 0.39 
10 85.99 2.21 3.16  0.94  3.93 1.51  1.48 
 
Thailand: 
Period Thailand  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 89.51  4.34  1.23 0.87 0.74  0.90 2.41 
10 81.59 4.81 3.98  3.49  2.07  1.82  2.24 
 
Philippines: 
Period Philippines  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Korea 
1  100  0  0  0 0 0 0 
5  89.56 3.63  0.29  1.11 1.42 1.84 2.13 
10  81.89 3.71  1.35  1.60 1.54 7.09 2.83 
 
Korea: 
Period Korea  USA  Singapore Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand  Philippines 
1 100 0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 82.97  11.06  1.12 0.31  0.52  3.61  0.41 
10 77.27  10.29  2.48  0.76  1.31  5.42  2.47 
 
Singapore: 
Period Singapore USA  Hong 
Kong 
Indonesia Thailand Philippines  Korea 
1 100  0  0  0  0  0  0 
5 79.87  16.00  1.21  0.47 2.02  0.27 0.12 
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